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ABSTRACT
One prominent explanation for disagreement in bargaining is that the
parties have divergent and relatively optimistic expectations regarding the
ultimate outcome if they fail to agree. The fact that settlement rates are
much higher where final—offer arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure
than where conventional arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure is
used as the basis of a test of the role of divergent expectations in causing
disagreement in negotiations. Calculations of identical—expectations contract
zones using existing estimates of models of arbitrator behavior yield larger
identical—expectations contract zones in conventional arbitration than in
final—offer arbitration. This evidence clearly suggests that divergent
expectations alone are not an adequate explanation of disagreement in labor—
management negotiations. A number of alternative explanations for
disagreement are suggested and evaluated.
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I. 1itrcductjon
One of the enduring puzzles in the analysis of bargaining iswhy there
is ever disagreement in cases where agreementappears to be in the interests
of both parties. For example, in labor-managementnegotiations, disagreement
imposes costs (of arbitration or of a strike) on both parties without
increasing the resources available to be split by the two parties. Failures
of negotiation lead to costly strikes, decreasedharmony in the workplace, and
threats to the survival of the organization and the jobs oforganizational
members. The labor—management relationship is just onecase in which
inefficiencies appear inherent in the negotiationprocess. Other important
inefficiencies occur in international negotiations over trade andpolitical
issues, merger negotiations, and family disputes (Raiffa, 1982; Pruittand
Rubin, 1985; Lewicki, Sheppard, and Bazernan, 1986).
One prominent explanation for disagreement in bargaining is that the
parties have divergent and relatively optimistic expectationsregarding the
ultimate outcome if they fail to agree (Hicks, 1963; Farber andKatz, 1979;
Bazerman and Neale, 1982). In the case where a thirdparty will render a
decision if the parties fail to agree, both partiesexpect to receive a
relatively favorable decision from the third party. In final—offer
arbitration, where the arbitrator must accept one offer or the other (andnot
compromise) ,itis obvious that 50% of the final offers submitted (1 of 2)
will be accepted. Neale and Bazerman (1983) foundstrong evidence of
relatively optimistic expectations when they asked subjects in a bargaining
experiment the probability that their final offer would beaccepted. The
average probability estimate was fully 68%. Such relative optimism can
prevent sufficient concessions in the negotiation process as both parties
inappropriately expect a favorable disagreement outcome.
There is substantial evidence supporting the claim that divergent2
expectations re common, and that they can be a cause of disagreement in
bargaining. However, the magnitude of the effect of divergent expectations on
the likelihood of disagreement is in question. In this study, we examine two
alternative forms of arbitration: conventional and final—offer. It is well
known that negotiated settlement rates are much higher under final—offer
arbitration than under conventional arbitration (e.g., Feuille, 1975,: Kochan
and Baderschneider, 1978; Notz and Starke, 1978; Grigsby and Bigoness, 1982;
Neale and Bazerman, 1983). We develop the argument that the hypothesis that
divert expçations are the prinary_cpse of diqreemeitimplies that
contract zones compited assuming (perhaps counterfactual) identical
pectations will be 1arg under the form of arbitration that leads to the
jg tement rate. We then examine empirical evidence on settlement
rates under the different forms of arbitration and compare them to the
predicted identical—expectations contract zones in order to explore whether or
not the data are consistent with the divergent expectations prediction.
Finally, we explore other explanations of disagreement in order to account for
the many important negotiation failures that occur in various settings.
Arbitration procedures are used in most U.S. labor contracts to settle
disputes that arise in the course of administration of labor agreements. This
1 is termed grievance arbitration.In order to avoid strikes by public sector
employees, by 1981 twenty states had specified that arbitration is to be used
to determine the actual terms of labor contracts among public sector employees
where the parties cannot agree (Freeman, 1986).Thisis termed interest
arbitration, and it is the focus of the analysis here.
Two types of arbitration are in wide use to settle interest disputes in
1. In 1980, approximately 97 percent of collective bargainingagreements
in the private sector covering 1000 or more workers included grievance
procedures with arbitration. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1981).3
the public sector. Conventional arbitration (CA), where the arbitrator is
free to make any award he or she sees fit, was the first to be used. After
some experience with this form of arbitration in the public sector, it was
argued that the arbitrator will have an incentive to split the difference
between the last offers of the parties resulting in a "chilling" of bargaining
as each party maintains extreme positions in order to receive a favorable
arbitration award in the event the parties fail to reach a negotiated
settlement. Final—offer arbitration (FOA), where the arbitrator is
constrained to make an award that is equal to one or the other of the parties'
last offers, is argued not to chill bargaining because the arbitrator is
explicitly prohibited from splitting the difference. In 1981 ten states had
laws specifying CA and ten states had laws specifying FOA to settle interest
disputes with some or all public employees (Freeman, 1986).
While the empirical evidence seems clear that settlement rates are, in
fact, higher under FOA, the rationale outlined above is not adequate.
Implicitly, this rationale relies on the assumption that contract zones (the
range of settlements that both parties would prefer to disagreement) are
larger or more likely to exist under FOA. However, this assumption is not
necessarily accurate. First, it is an empirical matter as to whether or not
contract zones are larger or more likely to exist in FOA (Farber 1980b),and
there is no direct evidence on this issue. Second, without a theory of
disagreement it is not clear that larger contract zones, do in fact lead to
more settlements. In the next section a theory of disagreement as being the
result of relatively optimistic expectations regarding the disagreement
outcome is briefly outlined. This model has the clear implication that larger
identical—expectations contract zones lead to more agreement. Accepting the
empirical evidence that there is higher likelihood of settlement in FOA than
in CA, a natural test of the theories, based on a comparison of the relative4
sizes of the contract zones in the two types of arbitration, is proposed.
Section III contains a brief description of the model of the parties'
decisions regarding their optimal offers given their expectations regarding
arbitrator behavior. These models are then used to describe how the implied
contract zones are derived under the two types of arbitration.
Given that the contract zone in arbitration depends fundamentally on the
behavior of the arbitrator, section IV contains a description of arbitrator
behavior in CA based on the model developed and estimated by Farber and
Bazerman (1986). Similarly, section V contains a description of arbitrator
behavior in FOA based on the same underlying model. Empirical estimates of
the parameters of the model of arbitrator behavior serve as an important
component of the calculation of contract zone sizes.
In section VI the particular pieces of the model required to compute
contract zone sizes, the preferences of the parties over the range of possible
outcomes and their prior distribution on the behavior of the arbitrator, are
specified. The computation of the contract zones based on these components is
also described.
In section VII the actual computations of contract zones are presented
for a range of risk preferences of the parties, uncertainty regarding the
arbitrator's behavior, and arbitrator sensitivity to the offers in CA. The
clear finding is that contract zones are substantially larger in CA than in
FOA. This finding is not consistent with the divergent expectations model of
disagreement.
Section VIII contains a discussion of four alternative explanations of
disagreement in view of the limitations of the divergent expectations
explanation found in the analysis. Each of these theories is evaluated and
discussed with regard to their implications for the empirical evidence
presented in this paper.5
II. Divergent Expectations, the Contract Zone, and Disagreement
A dispute settlement procedure will provide an incentive for the parties
to reach a negotiated agreement to the extent that the procedureimposes costs
on the parties in the event they fail to agree. Farber and Katz (1979)argue
that arbitration imposes costs on the parties largely due to the combination
of risk aversion by the parties and their uncertainty regarding the behavior
of the arbitrator. To the extent that the parties are riskaverse, they will
be willing to concede in negotiation from the expected arbitration award in
order to avoid the risk of an unfavorable award. Assuming that theparties
have identical expectations about the uncertain arbitration award, the result
is a contract zone of settlements that both parties prefer todisagreement.
In what follows this is called the identical—expectations contractzone to
distinguish it from the contract zone, per Se, which is therange of
settlements (if any) that both parties prefer to disagreement in practice,
where expectations regarding the arbitration awardmay differ.
The simplest theory of disagreement in this context is based on the
possibility that the parties have different prior distributions on the
arbitration award. If the parties are relatively optimistic regarding the
likely arbitration award (e.g., the union expects a higher wage award than the
employer expects) then the union will be willing to concede downward from a
higher wage than the employer is will to concede upward from. As noted in the
introduction, there is empirical evidence in the behavioral science literature
on negotiation suggesting that negotiators, and decision makers in general,
are overconfident and overoptimistic in their uncertain judgments (Neale and
Bazerman, l983, Bazerman and Neale, 1982) .Thus,while relative optimism is
not consistent with a simple equilibrium economic model, itmay well be true
that negotiators systematically misperceive their environment inways that6
could lead to disagreement.
Unless the costs imposed by uncertainty are sufficient to offset these
divergent expectations completely, there will not be a contract zone and there
will be no agreement. The identical—expectations contract zone, because itis
an indicator of the costs imposed by the unc inyregarding the arbitration
award, is a direct measure of how robust the actual contract zone is to
differences in expectations. Assuming that systematic differences in
expectations are independent of the type of arbitration scheme, this divergent
expectations model has the clear implication that larger identical—
expectations contract zones will lead to a higher likelihood of agreement in
actual cases where expectations may well differ.
In order to see this more clearly, consider a very simple model where a
union and employer are bargaining over some value Y where the union's utility
is positively related to Y and the employer's utility is negatively related to
Y. For example, Y might represent the wage. Let the cost of disagreement to
the union and employer respectively be represented by Cu and C respectively.
Let the union's and management's expectations regarding the arbitration award
be 'au and 'am respectively. Where the union and employer are risk—neutral





and the management will be willing to accept any settlement such that
(2.2) Y Y+C nm am in
The contract zone is defined by
(2.3) CZ =Y -Y=(Y-y) + (C +C ).
nm flu am au um
Where expectations are identical, Y =Yand the identical—expectations am au
contract zone reduces to the sum of the costs of disagreements,
(2.4)CZ =C+ C
0 u in7
Thus, the con ua t zorA n general is
(2.5)CZ =CZ+(Y
—Y), 0 am au
and a contract zone is more likely to exist fora given degree of difference
in expectations whereCZ0, the contract zone in the case of identical
expectations, is larger.
From the discussion in this section, the divergentexpectations theory
of disagreement can be examined based on a comparison of identical-
expectations contract zones under CA versus FOA. Assume first that the
evidence that FOA leads to less disagreement than CA isaccurate. Next,
compute the contract zones implied by CA and FOA. If it is found that
contract zones are larger in FOA than in CA, then the divergentexpectations
theory has additional support. However, evidence that contractzones are
larger in CA would not be consistent with the divergent expectationsmodel,
and alternatives would need to be considered. It must benoted that we are
not testing whether or not divergent expectations existor whether divergent
can be a cause of disagreement. Both of these questions have been answered
affirmatively by theoretical and empirical analysis in the existing
literature. Rather, this paper examines the sufficiency of thedivergent
expectations theory in accounting for disagreement in labor—management
negotiations.
III. Negotiator Behavior
A key feature of arbitrator behavior from the standpoint of the
negotiators is that they are likely to be uncertain about the arbitration
award, in a particular case. More formally, the arbitration awardcan be
expressed as
(3.1)Y =h.(Y ,y ,y s 1eu in
whereY represents the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate award8
independent of the otfers, Y is the union's offer, ad Y is the managements
offer. The function h.() represents the arbitration process by which and
the offers are combined to determine the award, and i =c,findexes the type
of arbitration scheme (conventional and final—offer respectively).2 The
likely source of the uncertainty is that the parties do not know
Each party, given its prior expectations and an assumption about its
opponents prior expectations, can compute the Nash equilibrium offers
associated with the type of arbitration that is in use. Where expectations
are identical, it is natural that each party derives the Nash equilibrium
assuming it's opponent's expectations are the same as its own. Where
expectations, in fact, differ each party may still proceed as if their
opponent has the same expectations it does. However, at some point it will
become apparent that the opponent actually holds different expectations. More
realistically, the difference in expectations may be common knowledge (an
"honest" difference of opinion?) so that each party computes the Nash
equilibrium offers with its own expectations about e but incorporating the
fact that their opponent is proceeding with their own expectations. The basic
conclusions of the analysis are not sensitive to which of these assumptions
are used, and the analysis proceeds assuming that the parties have identical
expectations about
From the Nash equilibrium offers each party can compute its equilibrium
expected utility from arbitration. Economic rationality requires that the
party not accept any negotiated settlement that yields it a utility level
lower than the expected utility from arbitration. More formally, let the
union's utility function be defined as
2. Clearly, the h(.) function will be different in the two forms of
arbitration, and the succeeding two sections of the paper focus on the form of9
(3.2)U U (Y)
U U
where U'>O, and let the employer's utility function be defined as
(3.3) U =U(Y) m m
where U '(0.
in
Assume that the parties' identical prior distribution regarding is
characterized by the density function g(e) where e is a parameter vector.3 On
this basis, the union's expected utility from arbitration is
(3.4) E[U] =E[U(h.(Y,Y,Y)))
where the expectation is taken over
'1eSimilarly, the employer's expected
utility from arbitration is
(35) ECU] =E[U(hi(Y,Y,Y))].
Note that the form of these general expressions are independent of whether CA
or FOA is in use. The form of the expectation and the role of the prior
distribution function (g(e)) depend crucially on the type of arbitration, but
in both cases the expected utilities are functions of both offers and the
parameters of the prior distribution on e4 Differentiating these expected
utilities with respect to Y and Y respectively and setting the results equal
to zero yields two equations in two unknowns (the offers) that can be solved
for the Nash equilibrium final offers. Denote the expected utilities
evaluated at the equilibrium offers by ECU] and E[U]. They are functions
strictly of the parameters of both parties' utility functions and the
parameters of the prior distribution °''e
Each party can calculate the negotiated settlement that makes it
the h(•) function in CA and FOA respectively.
3. This parameter vector contains all of the relevant facts of the case
exclusive of the offers.
4. The detailed presentations of these functions in the conventional and
final—offer cases are contained in Farber (1981) and Farber (l9SOa)
respectively.10
indifierent between a negotiated settlement and utilizing arbitration by
*
equating E [U.) =U.(Y.)wherej=u,m. The values Yand Yare the
J JCJ cu cm
certainty equivalent settlements of each party and they bound potential
negotiated settlements. The only negotiated settlements (Ye) that both
parties will prefer to arbitration are those that satisfy
(3.6) Y < Y <Y
cu n cm
and the range from Y —Ydefines the contract zone. As long as Yis cm cu cm
larger than there will exist mutually agreeable settlements and the
simplest theories of bargaining imply that there will be a negotiated
settlement.
It can be shown that a sufficient condition for there to be a positive
contract zone for the model outlined here is that neither party be risk
seeking. This is independent of whether CA or FOA is used. Thus, it seems as
if the parties always ought to reach negotiated agreements under both types of
arbitration. Of course, this is not the case, and the model must be
incomplete in a fundamental way. One obvious problem with the model is that
the assumption was made that both parties had the sane prior distribution
(g(e)) regarding the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate award 'e If the
parties have different expectations about Y (i.e., different e's) then their
optimal offers and certainty equivalents will differ from the ideal derived
above. More to the point, if the parties have relatively optimistic
expectations about e (for example, the mean of the union's prior distribution
on Y is higher than the employer's) then Ywill be higher relative to Y
e cu cm
and the contract zone will be smaller than that derived above.5 If
5. This conclusion also follows under the alternative assumptions that the
Nash equilibrium is derived 1) with each party assuming that its opponent has
the same expectations its does even when this is inappropriate or 2) with each
party understanding that its opponent has different expectations about the
arbitrator. See the discussion of this issue earlier in this section.11
'xpectatios are sufficiently optimistic, the contract zonemay even be
negative. In this case there will be no mutually acceptablenegotiated
settlements, and the parties will resort to arbitration.
For the purposes of the discussion here assume that the extentof
mismatch or relative optimism regarding'e is independent of the type of
arbitration scheme. In this context it is possible torestate the claim that
FOA encourages more negotiated settlements than CA in theterms of the our
model. The claim is that foragiven amount of relativeoptimism re4nY
(a given difference between e andem) there is more likely to be a contract
zone in FOA than in CA. It is a reasonable that movements in themeans of the
prior distributions have an effect in the same directionon the certainly
equivalents. In other words, an increase in the union's priorexpectation
(holding the employer's fixed) yields an increase in the union'scertainty
equivalent settlement. The result is a decrease in the size of thecontract
zone. On this basis, the claim for FOA can be restated asdeclaring that the
identical—expectations contract zone induced by FOA will be larger than the
identical—expectations contract zone induced by CA. Intuitively, if the
identical—expectation contract zone in FOA is larger it will takea greater
degree of relative optimism in expectations to offset it completely. Weturn
now to descriptions of arbitrator behavior in the two types of arbitration
required to calculate the relative size of the contract zones.
IV. Arbitrator Behavior in Conventional Arbitration
Farber (1981) argues that the pure split—the—difference model of
arbitrator behavior in CA, where the arbitration award is simplyan average of
the last offers, is not reasonable because it provides theparties with the
incentive to make their offers infinitely extreme. This iscertainly not
consistent with observed behavior, and casual conversation with arbitrators12
suggests that this .s because "unreasonable" offers are discounted or
disregarded by arbitrators. Clearly, there must exist a standard against
which to judge offers if some offers are to be thought unreasonable. Thus, a
richer framework for understanding arbitrator behavior in CA is required. A
reasonable framework is that the arbitrator examines the facts (exclusive of
the offers> in a particular case and makes a judgment based solely on these
facts regarding an equitable award. The actual award is then formulated as a
weighted average of this equitable award and the average of the last offers of
parties where the weights depend on the "quality" of the offers (Farber, 1981;
Bazerman and Farber, 1985). More formally, the arbitration award S> is
(4.1) y =y+(1—)Y s e
where e is the arbitrator's idea of an appropriate award based strictly on
the facts, Y represents the mean of the parties' last offers, andis the
weight on the appropriate award relative to the last offers. This is the
framework underlying much of the recent empirical analyses of arbitrator
behavior. Some empirical studies (Bloom, 1986) have proceeded under the
assumption thatis fixed while others (Bazerman and Farber, 1985; Farber and
Bazerman, 1986) have argued thatis a function of the quality of the offers.
Specifically, they argue thatis an increasing function of the difference
between the last offers.
If it is assumed that the weight on the offers (1—v) is fixed then the
problem of unboundedness of the last offers remains. Imagine that the first
party is interested in maximizing andthe second party is interested in
minimizing Y. Clearly, the first party can increase Y5 without limit by
increasing its offer which increases Y,andthe second party can decrease
without limit by decreasing its offer which decreases Y.
Farber (1981) considers the case where 'issensitive to the quality of
the offers and where the parties are uncertain about 'eIn this situation,13
each side i f;e t. ]ect 1t off: so as to maximize its expected
utility from an arbitration award. The Nash equilibrium pair of offers is
derived, and it is demonstrated that the last offers are bounded.
Interestingly, it is also shown that what appears to be splitting—the—
difference behavior by the arbitrators (arbitration awards thatcan be
described as weighted averages of the offers) nay well be the partieschoosing
offers that "surround" the expectation of the arbitrator's appropriateaward.
To the extent that this is the correct model of arbitrator behavior, the
degree of chilling of bargaining in CA depends on the marginal effect of
changes in the offers on the arbitration award, and it can only be resolved
empirically.
The key studies that provide estimates ofare Bazerman (1985),
Bazerman and Farber (1985), Bloom (1986), and Farber and Bazerman (1986).
Bazermari and Farber use data derived from decisions of professional
arbitrators in twenty—five rather tersely described hypotheticalcases that
were constructed so that the offers were orthogonal to the facts. They find
both that the primary weight is on the facts of each case even where the
offers are of relatively high quality (close together) and that the weighton
the offers declines as the offers move further apart. Bloomuses data derived
from the decisions of professional arbitrators in hypotheticalcases that were
patterned very closely after actual cases involving public sector employees in
New Jersey. The arbitrators were presented with a complete record of facts of
these cases while the offers were modified in each case when presented to
different arbitrators in order to provide a range of offers corresponding toa
given set of facts. There was no attempt to make the offers orthogonal to the
facts. Bloom finds that the primary weight is on the offers so that, while
the facts can have a substantial effect on the arbitration award indirectly
through their effect on the offers, splitting—the—difference is quite a good14
descriptiono arbitrator behavior in CA.
What accounts for the seeming difference between the findings of these
studies? In our opinion it is largely a matter of interpretation. The
apparent difference occurs because of the orthogonality of the facts and
offers in Bazerman and Farber's study as opposed to the correlation of the
facts and the offers in Bloom's study. What Bloom defines as the effect of
the offers is, as he recognizes, some combination of the pure effect of the
offers and the effect of that part of the offers that simply reflects the
facts of the case.
In order to see this more clearly, consider the model of arbitrator
behavior described above with fixed .Bloomessentially regresses the
arbitration award on the average offer and a set of variable summarizing the
facts. This regression model is
(4.2) Y=0+eY +OY+E
s 0le 2
where 0i and 02 are the weights on the facts and the offers (Y)
6 respectively,and E is a random component.However, the average offer can be
thought of as a linear combination of the facts and a random component so that
(4.3) y= +Y +i.i 0le
where and are parameters and i is a random component. Substitution of






It is clear fromthis expression that the overall effect of the facts on the
arbitrationaward is [e1+e21 rather than simply ei. Bloom's conclusion that
splitting—the—differenceis agood description ofthebehavior ofarbitrators
inCA is based on the lack of significance of the estimate of when equation
6. This equation is the empirical analogue of equation (4.1) with fixed .15
(42) is estimated. However, it neglects the indirect effect ofY through
the offers on the award.7
Bloom's findings are properly interpreted as implying that the facts
alone are not sufficient to explain arbitrator behavior in CA(82>0), but it
is impossible to determine exactly how important the offers are without an
estimate of how the facts affect the offers
(.).Ofcourse, in actual cases
the offers are not often at odds with facts. Farber's (1981) model suggests
that the offers largely reflect the facts of a particular case so that the
observed offers will not be orthogonal to the observed facts. Bazerxnan and
Farber's experiment of generating arbitration awards where the offers are
orthogonal to the facts (si=0) provides a clearer measure of the relative
importance of the offers and the facts in influencing arbitration awards.
V. Arbitrator Behavior in Final—Offer Arbitration
The behavior of the arbitrator is much clearer in FOA than in CA due to
the restricted nature of the arbitrators behavior in the final—offer case.
There is no debate regarding whether or the extent to which the arbitrator use
the offers in making an award. The rules of FOA require use of the offers.
Similarly, there is consensus that the arbitrator uses the facts in selecting
that "winning" final offer. After all, what else could the arbitrator use to
make a reasoned choice?8 This section is relatively brief, reflecting the
general agreement regarding arbitrator behavior under FOA rather than any lack
of understanding or interest in FOA relative to CA.
7. No evidence on the magnitude of is presented, but it is clearly
positive from Bloom's description of the way in which the scenarios were
developed.
8. As vii]. be discussed in the last section of this paper, this
transparency of arbitrator behavior may be part of the explanation for fewer
disagreements under FOA.16
Farber (1980a) argues that where the arbitrator is constrained to select
one or the other of the last offers as the arbitration award he/she will
select the offer that is closest to the arbitrator's notion of an appropriate
award (Y)• In this case, the probability of choosing the firm's offer is
Pr(Y<Y), and each party selects the offer that maximizes its expected
utility. The tradeoff for the union is that a higher offer is worth more if
it is selected but it has a lower probability of being selected. The firm
faces an analogous tradeoff. Farber (1980a) derives the Nash equilibrium pair
of offers in the FOA case. Given the tradeoff inherent in the final—offer
process, the offers are bounded and there is no obvious chilling effect. This
combined with the aforementioned ambiguity regarding arbitrator behavior in CA
is the basis of the conventional wisdom that the availability of FOA is more
likely to result in a negotiated settlement than CA.9
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) and Farber and Bazerman (1986) present
evidence that is consistent with this model. Ashenfelter and Bloom, using
data on actual police and fire arbitrations in New Jersey, find that the
probability of selecting the employer's offer is directly related to the
average final offer. In addition, they find that the determinants of
implicit in FOA awards are not significantly different from the determinants
of e implicit in the CA awards. Farber and Bazerman, using data generated
from the same set of hypothetical cases decided by professional arbitrators
described in the previous section, reach similar conclusions. In addition,
they have data on both conventional and final—offer awards in the same cases
that are used to strengthen the conclusion that there is common underlying
9. As long as the weight on the offers relative to the facts is a function
of the quality of the offers, the offers are also bounded in CA. One of the
themes of this study is that it is not obvious, a priori, which type of
arbitration ought to lead to less disagreement.17
notion of an appropriate award thatgoverns arbitrator behavior in both CA arid
FOA.
VI. TheSpecificationof the Nodel
To the extent possible the calculations of theidentical—expectations
contract zones are based on empirical estimates of therelevant behavioral
functions. Central to the analysis is the behaviorof the arbitrators, and we
rely on estimates of the models of arbitrator behavior inCA and FOA derived
by Farber and Bazernan (1986). This is a particularlyconvenient choice
because the hypothetical cases that their arbitratorsdecide can be integrated
into a general model of negotiator behaviorvery conveniently. In the model
of CA, the key parameters represent thesensitivity of the arbitration award
to changes in the offers. Recall from equation(4.1) that the arbitration
award is a weighted average of the arbitrator's notionof an appropriate award
and the average of the offers (Y). The key idea isthat the weight
depends on the quality of the offers so that the weight thearbitrator puts on
is inversely related to the quality of the offers.The function used by
Farber and Bazerman is
(6.1) = +
whereY and Y are the offers of the union andmanagement respectively. The
parameter is positive reflecting the notion that theweight on the offers
(1—i) is relatively low where the parties are far fromagreement.
Bazerman and Farber derive surprisingly large estimates forat the
observed differences in offers which suggests that thearbitrator puts most of




where the numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic standard errors. The range of
difference between the offers in the hypothetical cases was from approximately
.01 (1 percentage point in the wage increase) to .12 (12 percentage points in
the wage increase). Clearly, the smallest predicted value ofis .74
(se=.05) so that even where the parties are close to agreement three
quarters of the weight is on the facts. At the largest sample values of Y—
the predicted value ofis approximately .93 (se=.03). Thus, the
marginal effect of a change in the offers on the weights is relatively small.
Given the much smaller value forimplicit in the recent study by Bloom
(1986), the identical—expectations contract zones will also be computed using
lover values for for comparison. While Bloom's work does not address the
issue of the sensitivity of the weights to the quality of the offers,
identical—expectations contract zones will also be computed using a variety of
values of in order to investigate the how sensitive the identical—
expectations contract zone is to this parameter.
The other parameter of interest from the Farber and Bazermam estimation
is the variance of ''e to the extent that this is a plausible estimate of the
parties' uncertainty regarding Y. They specify the function determining
as
(6.3)'1e =X+
whereX is a vector of observable characteristics of each case,is a vector
of parameters, and Eisa random component. Assuming thatand X are known
exante, the relevant variance is the variance of E.Farberand Bazerman's
estimate of this variance is .000449 (se=.0000228))0
10. Farber and Bazerman also estimate the variance of an additive error
implicit in equation (4.1) determining the actual award. This variance is19
In FOA, the arbitrator is assumed to se.ect the offer thatis closest to
'e Clearly, the weighting function ()isnot relevant. However, the
variance of ''e is central, and the estimate of the varianceof Ederivedby
Farber and Bazerman for FOA is .000344 (se=.0000243). Thisis very close to
the variance of Einthe CA case although the hypothesis that the variances
are equal can be rejected at conventional levels of significance11We proceed
using a common value of .0004 for the variance ofe although identical—
expectations contract zones are also calculated for arange of other values
for comparison purposes.
Bazerman (1985) finds that arbitrators differsubstantially in the
weights they place on the various factors that determinee In other words,
differs across arbitrators. The parties are likely to beuncertain about
what arbitrator they will get, yielding a prior distributionon .Inthis
case, assuming independence ofand ,VAR(Ye)
=X{VAR()]x'+VAR(E)which
is certainly larger than VAR(E). Given that theuncertainty regarding the
identity of the arbitrator is revealed before the arbitrationaward, the
uncertainty about ?e is reduced at this stage. In some cases theparties
might bargain to this stage in order to see if theyget a "good" arbitrator,
and once this uncertainty is resolved they would settle. Thiscould explain
why settlements occur between the point in theprocess when the arbitrator is
appointed and when the arbitration hearing takes place.12 Given the
difficulty of incorporating this feature of the process into thecomputations
much smaller: .0000114 (se=.00000395). We ignore thissource of randomness
here here.
11. The differences in variances is 1.05x10—4 while thestandard error of
the difference is .384x10—4. Note that the conventional andfinal—offer
decisions were analyzed jointly so that there is a covariancebetween the
estimated variances that was taken into account in computing thevariance of
the difference. See Farber and Bazerman (1986).
12. Bloom and Cavanagh (1986) present an interestinganalysis of the
arbitration selection mechanism that has implications for thisdiscussion.20
and the fact that uncertainty regarding the identity of the arbitrator is
often revealed before the last offers are finalized, this source of
uncertainty does not play a direct role in our calculations.
The central aspect of both union and employer preferences that is
relevant for the determination of the identical—expectations contract zone is
attitude toward risk. While there is an extensive empirical literature on
union utility functions, there is little evidence that bears directly on the
degree of risk aversion.'3 Similarly, most of the literature on firm behavior
assumes risk neutrality, but this is not evidence on attitude toward risk.
The analysis proceeds by assuming that the parties have constant
absolute risk aversion utility functions defined over wages that are
symmetrical in form. The union's utility function is
(6.4) U(Y) =1-
exp[—6(Y—Y1)]
where &isthe union's coefficient of absolute risk aversion and Y
u 1
represents a minimum value of Y that serves as a benchmark to the union.
Similarly, the employer's utility function is
(6.5) U(Y) =1-
exp{—&(Yh-Y)]
where is the employer's coefficient of absolute risk aversion and
represents a maximum value of Y that serves as a benchmark to the employer.
The union's utility is increasing in Y while the employer's utility is
decreasing in Y. Without an empirical guide to appropriate values for and
13. Farber (1978), Dertouzos and Pencavel (1980), Carruth and Oswald
(1983) ,Pencavel(1984) ,Brownand Ashenfelter (1986) ,andMaCurdy and
Pencavel (1986) all present studies of union behavior based on utility
maximization. Only Farber (1978) presents an explicit estimate of the union's
risk aversion. However, his estimate is based on the tradeoff between wages
and employment in determining wages, and this is not really the sort of risk
considered here. Farber (1986) presents a survey of this literature. See
Tversky and Kahrieman (1974) and Bazerman (1986) for more general behavioral
discussions of decision making under uncertainty.21
6,ideatical—expectatjonscontract zones re computed for a wide variety of
values of s and ranging from 5 to ioo.14
It is assumed that the parties' prior distribution on''e is normal with
mean .1 (think of this as an average 10 percent wage increase) and variance
.0004. The particular value selected for the mean is notcrucial, and the
qualitative nature of the findings will not be affected by a differentchoice
of mean. The crucial assumption regarding themean is that both parties's
beliefs about V are identical. On the the basis of thisassumption and the
definition of Y in equation (4.1), the actual CA award is alsodistributed




Given that +' (Y—Y ),itis clear that both the mean and variance of the 0 lum
distribution of actual awards are functions of the offers.
The expected utility of the union in CA is
(6.8) E(U) =J' U(Y)f(Y) dY,
where f(Y) is the appropriate normal density function.Similarly, the
employer's expected utility in CA is
(6.9) E(U) =U(Y)f(Y) dY.
Both of these expected utilities are functions of the offers becauseY is
fundamentally affected by the offers both directly and through the 'function.
The direct effect of an increase in the union's offer ora decrease in the
employer's offer on the arbitration award is offset by a reduction in the
weight placed on the offers. This is the tradeoff faced by the parties in
14. Given an average value of Y of .1, thisrange of absolute risk
aversions translates into a range o relative risk aversions of .5 to 10.22
selecting th€iroffers.It each party can manipulate its last offer so as to
maximize its own expected utility, a natural equilibrium concept is the Nash
Equilibrium. This is the pair of offers that has the property that neither
party can increase its expected utility by changing its offer.
Given the Nash equilibrium offers, it is straightforward to derive the
certainty equivalent outcomes that determine the limits of the identical—
expectations contract zone as described in section III. If at least one party
is risk averse (>O or £>0) and neither party is risk seeking (￿0 and
it is true that this identical—expectations contract zone will be of
positive length.
In FOA, the arbitrator is constrained to select one or the other of the
parties' final offers. In this case the arbitrator is assumed to select the
offer that is closest to Y. Given the assumption of a normal distribution
for Y described above, the probability of choosing the employer's offer is
(6.10) m =Pr(Y(Y)=F(Y)
where F(•) represents the normal cumulative distribution function of ''e with
appropriate mean and variance. The union's expected utility from arbitration
in this case is
(6.11) E(IJ ) =PU (Y ) +[1—P]U (Y u mu in mUU
whilethe employer's expected utility from arbitration is
(6.12) E(U )= PU (Y)+ [1—P]U (Y ).
in mm m ininu
Note that an increase in the union's offer increases its payoff if its offer
is selected, but it reduces the probability that its offer is, in fact,
selected. Similarly, a decrease in the management's offer increases its
payoff if its offer is selected, but it reduces the probability that its offer
is, in fact, selected. This is the fundamental tradeoff the parties face in
selecting their optimal offers in FOA. The Nash equilibrium pair of offers,
are derived as above. These offers are used to compute the levels of expected23
utilities that define tne certainty equivalent outcoes, Yand Y,thatare cu cm
the limits of the identical—expectations contractzone. Once again, as long
as at least one party is risk averse and neither party is riskseeking, it
will be true that y <yso that there exists a positive identical— cu cm
expectations contract zone.
Denote the size of the identical—expectations contractzone under CA and
FOA by CZ and CZf respectively. The analysis consists ofcomputing values of
CZ and CZf using the assumed specification of union andemployer preferences
described above combined with the specification of arbitrator behaviorbased
on Farber and Bazerman's (1986) explicitly estimated model of arbitrator
behavior. These identical—expectations contract zonesare computed for a
range of values of union and employer risk aversions, levels of uncertainty
about e' and parameters of the arbitrator's weighting function ()inCA.
VII. Estimates of Identical—Expectations Contract Zone Size
Table 1 contains estimates of identical—expectations contractzone size
in CA and FOA for a range of levels of risk aversions and varianceof Y .All e
of these values are computed at the point estimates of and presented in
the last section and derived from Farber and Bazerman (1986). Theresults are
quite striking. Except at the lowest levels of risk aversion, whereCZ and
CZf are virtually indistinguishable, the identical—expectations contract zones
in CA are uniformly larger than the identical—expectations contractzones in
FOA. As expected, the identical—expectations contract zones increase in size
with the variance of 'te' but the finding of larger identical-expectations
contract zones in CA persists. In addition, the differences are not small.
For example, the identical—expectations contract zone is fully two andone
half times larger in CA for the intermediate case where &=& =50and u inTable 1.
Contract Zones for Various Levels of Risk Aversion and Variance of Ye
S &IVar=.0002 Var=.0004 Var=.0006 Var=.002
U
IFOACONY FOACONY FOACONVFOA CONY
.5 5 i.0013.0010.0025 .0020 .0036 .0029 .0098 .0094
20 5 .0027 .0025.0047 .0049 .0064 .0072 .0149 .0216
20 20 .0036 .0039.0059 .0076 .0078 .0112 .0164 .0318
50 5 .0041 .0053 .0066 .0103 .0085 .0150.0163 .0403
50 20 .0045 .0067.0070 .0129 .0089 .0185 .0163 .0474
50 50 I.0050.0094.0074 .0178 .0091 .0251 .0157 .0586
100 5 I.0050.0099 .0073 .0185 .0089 .0262 .0141 .0601
100 20 t .0051 .0112.0074 .0208 .0089 .0292 .0142 .0642
100 50 I.0052.0137 .0074 .0252 .0089 .0384 .0138 .0705
100 100 .0053 .0178 .0072 .0318 .0084 .0429 .0127 .0770
All estimates assume o =.741+1.53(Y—Y ). urn24
Var—.0004.ifl aSc1ute terms, the ientcai—ex,ectatjons contractzone in CA
is approximately 2.5 percentage points ofwage increase while it is only 0.9
percentage points of wage increase in FOA.
It is possible that the finding that the identical—expectationscontract
zone is larger in CA than in FOA is quite sensitive to the particularvalues
selected forand .Inorder to investigate this more fully, table 2
contains estimates of identical—expectations contractzone size in CA and FOA
for a range of values of and Allof these values are computed assuming
that Var(Y)=.0004, and the estimates of theidentical—expectations contract
zones in FOA, contained in the first column of table 2,are not affected by
the choice of '.
Thesecond column of table 2 contains estimates of the identical—
expectations contract zone in CA for the actual point estimates derivedby
Farber and Bazerman (1986)('o=.741, 'i153). The third column contains the
estimates for a model meant to reflect Bloom's (1986) conclusionthat
splittjng—the—differce is a good description of arbitrator behavior.In
this case, is unchanged while is reduced to 0.25 so that the weight on
is small where the offers are close together. Theidentical—expectations
contract zones are not at all affected by a shift in holding the other
parameters fixed. In more formal terms, it can be shown that theequilibrium
value of the identical—expectations contract zone in CA is
(7.1 CZ =
whichdepends solely on the parameters of the utility functions, the
parameters of the prior distribution one' and the equilibrium value of '.
Thelatter is
(7.2)'=
whichdepends only on the parameters of the utility functions, theparameters
of the prior distribution one' and the parameter It does not depend onTable 2
Contract Zones under Alternative Assumptions about







'o.741 o25 o741 o741
i1.53ci=.5Ob1=5.O
5 5 I .0025 .0020 .0020 .0020 .0019
20 5 i .0047 .0049 .0049 .0050 .0045
20 20 i .0059 .0076 .0076 .0079 .0069
50 5 I .0066 .0103 .0103 .0108 .0089
50 20 .0070 .0129 .0129 .0136 .0108
50 50 I .0074 .0178 .0178 .0192 .0139
100 5 I .0073 .0185.0185 .0201 .0143
10020 I .0074 .0208 .0208 .0229 .0156
10050 I .0074 .0252 .0252 .0283 .0178
100100 .0072 .0318 .0318 .0370 .0204
All estimates assume variance of25
'h±s ''xtreme rsilt is crtair1y an artifact of the linear
specification for .However,it is likely to approximate the findings from
more general specifications.
The third column of table 2 contains estimates of the identical—
expectations contract zone in CA for the case where the weights are less
sensitive to the offers (i=O.5). In this case, the identical—expectations
contract zone is even larger than in the base case('i=1.53). Intuitively,
the parties face an even worse tradeoff in attempting to reduce the riskby
shifting the weight away from 'eThe last column of table 2 contains
estimates of the identical—expectations contract zone in CA for thecase where
the weights are very sensitive to the offers(i=5.O). In this case the
identical—expectations contract zones in CA are smaller than in the basecase,
but they are still larger than in FOA.
Overall, the finding that identical—expectations contract zones are
larger in CA than in FOA seems robust to fairly large changes in the
parameters of the model.16 The immediate interpretation of this result is
that the divergent expectations model of disagreement is not what isdriving
the higher rate of disagreement in CA relative to FOIL
VIII. Alternative Explanations for Disagreement
The evidence presented in this paper clearly suggests that the divergent
expectations argument does not fully explain the disagreements that occur in
15. For the equilibrium value ofto be independent of it must be the
case that where is lower the equilibrium offers must be further apart in
order to compensae (increase the value of ).Thisis confirmed in table 4.
However, the uncertainty regarding the arbitration award comes solely from Y
so that the contract zone is unchanged as long as 'isunchanged.
e
16. Of course, the findings may not be robust to changes in the functional
forms of the utility functions or the prior distribution26
the labor—managenent negotiations. In fact, the ide'tical—expectations
contract zones are in direct contrast to the predictions of the divergent
expectations argument. Other explanations of disagreement are necessary. We
propose four alternatives based on an analysis of economic, structural, and
cognitive features of the negotiation process. For each explanation, we
evaluate the degree to which the predictions of that explanation are
consistent with our evidence.
One class of models that has been suggested recently as an equilibrium
explanation for disagreements in bargaining is based on the idea that there is
asymmetric information held by party 1 that party 2 attempts to learn about by
making offers that party 1 is free to accept or reject (.e.g. Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1981; Sobel and Takahashi, 1983; and Tracy, 1986) .Themost common
form of the argument (very simplified here) is that firms have private
information about their profitability that they cannot credibly transmit to
the union. In a two period model, the union formulates a first—period demand
that the firm will accept if it is high profit (resulting in agreement) and
reject if it is low profit (resulting in disagreement). This strategy is
optimal from the union's point of view since it would like a high wage if
possible. The firm can only make credible the fact that it is low profit by
incurring the cost of disagreement. Hence, there will be disagreement some of
the time. This theory has the clear implication (Tracy, 1986) that there will
be less disagreement where the total costs of disagreement are higher.
Given that identical—expectations contract zone size is an indicator of
total costs of disagreement, this simple theory predicts that there would be
less disagreement where the identical—expectations contract zone is smaller.
This is not consistent with the basic evidence that identical—expectations
contract zones are larger and there is more disagreement in CA than in FOA.
This suggests that learning in at least such simple models of asymmetric27
i:formation s not a sufficient explanation of disagreement.
Another recent alternative classs of models of disagreement has been
developed by Crawford (1982) and is based on Schelling's (1956) model of
commitment. The basic idea is that it may be advantageous in bargaining for
the parties to commit to a position that would be very costly to disavow.
Crawford (1982) develops a model where the potential for commitment by both
parties can lead to disagreement as long as there is an element of
irreversibility in the commitment and there is uncertainty about the strength
of the parties' commitments. A sketch of the model is that commitment is
reversible only at some uncertain cost and neither party knows this cost ex
ante. In the first stage of bargaining in this model the parties determine
whether they will attempt commitment. In the second stage, the cost of
backing down is revealed to each party but not to the other party. At this
point each party determines if they should back down, not knowing for certain
whether the other party will back down.
Three classes of outcomes are possible. If both parties commit, there
is disagreement. If only one party commits, that party gets a favorable
settlement. Finally, if neither party commits, there is some solution concept
that leads to agreement. The key is that there is a nonzero probability that
both parties commit successfully, resulting in disagreement. Anything that
increases the payoff to commitment will increase the probability of successful
commitment and, hence, the probability of disagreement. Where the contract
zone is large, a successful commitment may or may not have a larger payoff.
Crawford argues that there is no clear prediction of the model regarding the
extent to which the size of the contract zone affects the likelihood of
commitment. However, he concludes that the conditions on the model required
to predict unambiguously that larger contract zones lead to less commitment
(and hence less disagreement) are not likely to be satisfied.28
W±t-iregardto the evidence, this commitment theory has no implicationt
for the relationship between contract zone size and the likelihood of
agreement. Indeed, it is difficult to think of what evidence could be used to
test this theory. Thus, while the commitment theory does not contradict the
evidence, this is simply because of a lack of a clear prediction. The theory
does not predict the strong pattern of evidence.
The third alternative explanation of disagreement concerns the
structural feature of the arbitration process that arbitrators often receive
information from the parties in hearings regarding the course of negotiations.
In this context, it will be difficult for the parties to "retrench" from
concessions made in bargaining in order to present the optimal offers to the
arbitrators. For example, if the union's optinal offer for the arbitrator is
a 10 percent wage increase but it's certainty equivalent is 6 percent (the
least it will accept in bargaining), the union may be reluctant to concede
much below ten percent if it is uncertain about reaching agreement for fear an
offer to settle of, say, 8 percent will be used against it in the hearing with
the arbitrator.17 It is reasonable to argue that where the equilibrium offers
to be presented to the arbitrator are farther apart, the parties will be more
reluctant to concede in bargaining. In addition, where the parties are far
apart, perhaps because of a reluctance to concede, they are likely to be less
certain that a negotiated settlement is possible. Where the optimal offers
are closer together, the parties will more likely be able to concede to a
17. In the civil—court system, which is perfectly analogous to labor
arbitration (out—of-court settlement =negotiatedsettlement, trial outcome =
arbitrationaward), offers to settle out of court are not admissible as
evidence in a trial. This is precisely to avoid a reluctance to concede in
attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. Wheeler (1977) suggests that
arbitration procedures be modified to more closely reflect the civil—court
system by having the record of the negotiations not admissible. He calls his
procedure closed—offer arbitration.29
point where agreement looks more certain,encouraging further concession and
eventual agreement.
With regard to the evidence presented above, thehigher settlement rates
in FOA are consistent with thisargument if the optimal offers in FOA are
closer together than the optimal offers in CA. Table3 contains calculations
of the differences in the final offers for thevalues of union and employer
risk aversion and the level ofuncertainty regarding '1e used in the previous
section. In every case, the offers are much fartherapart in CA than in FOA
(in the intermediate case (& =&=50,Var=.0004) by a factor of 5). Table 4
contains estimates of the difference in the offers forvarious values of the
parameters of the CA weighting function. Except for thecase (column 5) where
the weight is extremely sensitive to the differencein the offers (=5.0), it
is true that the offers are much furtherapart in CA than FOA. In the middle
risk aversion case (8=5=50) approximating Bloom'sestimates of the weighting
function ('=.25. i=1.53), the difference in offers inCA is fully 18 times
larger than the difference in the offers in FOA (.453versus .0251).
Intuitively, where the marginal effect of a change in the offerson 'issmall
(column 3), the equilibrium offers in CA will be farapart. Where the
marginal effect is large, the equilibrium offers will be closetogether
(column 4).
The evidence is clearly consistent with thehypothesis that the higher
settlement rate in FOA is due to theconvergence of the optimal offers in FOA
combined with the structural features of the arbitrationprocess that make it
difficult to retrench to the optimal offersonce concessions beyond that point
have been made.
The final potential explanation of disagreement is basedon the notion
that the effect of the offers on the arbitration awardis much more salient to
the parties in FOA than in CA. That this is possible isobvious from theTable 3.






CONVFOA CONVFOA CONV FOACONy
5 5 i.0326.1673 .0447.1653 .0535.1633 .0890.1499
20 5 t .0294.1643 .0390.1594 .0457.1546 .0708.1228
2020 i .0268.1614 .0347.1537 .0401.1461 .0588.0980
50 5 i.0250.1585 .0321.1480 .0368.1379 .0538.0751
5020 i .0231.1556 .0291.1424 .0331.1298 .0464.0540
50 50 i.0204.1499 .0251.1316 .0281.1143 .0378.0161
100 5 I.0207.1489 .0259.1298 .0293.1118 .0417.0103
10020 .0194.1461 .0239.1246 .0268.1044 .0367.0063
10050 .0174.1406.0210.1143 .0233.0902 .0305.0363
100100 .0151.1316 .0179.0980 .0197.0679 .0250.0789
All estimates assume '= .741+1.53(Y—Y).Table 4






5 5 i .0447 .1653 .486 .514 .0478
20 5 i .0390 .1594 .480 .508 .0423
20 20 : .0347 .1537 .475 .502 .0370
50 5 I .0321 .1480 .469 .496 .0320
50 20 i .0291 .1424 .463 .490 .0272
50 50 i .0251 .1316 .453 .479 .0184
100 I .0259 .1298 .451 .477 .0170
100 20 : .0239 .1246 .445 .471 .0131
100 50 I .0210 .1143 .435 .460 .0056
100100 i .0179 .0980 .419 .441 .0000
All estimates assume variance of30
structur€s of the two procedures. In FOA there is no escaping consideration
of the direct effect that a party's offer will have on the arbitration award.
In CA, the parties could well ignore the effects that their offers have on the
awards and maintain extreme positions. In essence, this argument has as its
base that the parties do not calculate the optimal offers the way that was
outlined above in CA. In FOA they may do something closer to what was
outlined for that procedure because FOA is structured in a way that highlights
the relevant tradeoffs. In the context of negotiation, there is evidence from
the laboratory (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987) that negotiators are generally not
very good at working out the structure of the game they are playing or
considering the perspective of opponents and third parties. At the same time
there is laboratory evidence (Bazerxnan and Neale, 1982; Neale and Bazerman,
1983) that FOA encourages more concessionary behavior than CA precisely
because its structure encourages each party to take the perspective of the
other party, a trait that they show leads to more agreement.
Overall, the evidence presented in this study (higher settlement rates
in FOA relative to CA, larger identical—expectations contract zones in CA, and
more disperse offers in CA) casts some doubt that a divergence of expectations
regarding the disagreement outcome is the primary cause of failure to reach a
negotiated settlement. The evidence also is not consistent with the view that
labor disputes are due to optimal learning by one party in a situation where
there is private information held by one party that can be extracted through a
labor dispute. The model of disagreement as the result of commitment
strategies considered here has no clear implications for our evidence so that
18. It is also obvious from the presentations in sections IV and V of
arbitrator behavior in CA and FOA respectively. The discussion of CA is long
and involved while the discussion of FOA is relatively concise.31
it cannot be evaluated here. A pair of alternativesthat are consistent with
the evidence are presented including 1)a reluctance to concede where the
optimal offers for the arbitrator are far apart in fearthat concessions could
"come back to haunt them" in arbitration and 2)a lack of salience of the role
of the offers leading to a failure to take theopponents perspective in CA.32
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